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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court specifically acknowledged in its Memorandum
Decision that it relied on an examination of the default provision in the lease and the Notice itself in reaching its conclusion that the Notice did not constitute an election of remedies.
The trial court did not resort to extrinsic evidence as to
Century Park's intent because there was none presented at trial.
The question before the court was one of document interpretation.
Therefore, the court's decision was a conclusion of law rather
than a finding of fact.

It should be reviewed for correctness.

It is a question of law for this Court to determine whether the
Notice to Pay or Quit constituted an election of remedies and a
termination of the lease absent any testimony whatsoever regarding either party's intent.
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The distinctions Century Park has drawn between the unlawful
detainer statutes of Utah and Colorado, in an attempt to distinguish Colorado case law directly on point, are meaningless.
There is little basis for the proposition that the Colorado court
formulated its rule solely on the basis of the unlawful detainer
statute.

Furthermore, both Utah and Colorado statutes speak in

terms of a "forfeiture."

Utah should follow other jurisdictions

which have considered the issue now before this Court and hold
that a Notice to Pay Rent or Quit constitutes an election by the
landlord to terminate the lease.

Bireley should be held liable

for rent only through the date he quit the premises upon receipt
of said notice.

Clear language is required to preserve the right

of the landlord to continue to recover rent under a lease after a
Notice to Pay Rent or Quit has been served upon the tenant.
Finally, if a landlord is to continue to hold a tenant
liable under the lease, he must do so essentially as the tenant's
agent.

The tenant retains a possessory right subject only to the

landlord's reasonable mitigation efforts.

Here, Century Park

simply took back the premises and relet them directly without
regard to any rights of Bireley.

Further, Century Park gave

Bireley no written indication whatever, including the pleadings
in this case, that it intended to continue to hold Bireley
responsible for rent after he vacated the premises pursuant to
the Notice to Pay or Quit.

Consequently, any discussion

regarding mitigation efforts are misplaced under the facts of
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this case.

Because the evidence at trial indicates Century Park

never gave any consideration to Bireley in exchange for a promise
to continue to pay rent for the duration of the lease term, there
is no basis for any finding that the lease was enforceable beyond
the election to terminate in November 1987.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, WITH RESPECT TO
CENTURY PARK'S INTENT IN SERVING THE NOTICE
TO PAY RENT OR QUIT, WAS A CONCLUSION OF LAW
TO BE REVIEWED UNDER A CORRECTION OF ERROR
STANDARD.
Century Park argues that this case should be reviewed under
the "clearly erroneous" standard set out in Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a).

That rule provides:

"Findings of fact, whether

based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."

But the trial court's decision with respect to

Century Park's intent in serving the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit
was not a finding of fact, but rather, a conclusion of law based
upon an interpretation of the documents involved, without resort
to extrinsic evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that the labels
attached to findings of fact or conclusions of law are not determinative.

Specifically, in Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National
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Am. Title Ins, Co., 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
Questions of contract interpretation not requiring
resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on
such questions we accord the trial court's interpretation no presumption of correctness.
[W]e have determined that the trial court's finding of
an agreement to pay fees was, in fact, a legal conclusion based on its interpretation of a provision in
the insurance policy. . . . It is fair to say that a
finding of fact that is actually a conclusion of law
will be treated as a conclusion of law . . . As noted
above, a conclusion of law is reviewed for correctness.
Id. at 653, 656.
The only evidence of Century Park's intent in serving the
Notice to Pay Rent or Quit is the Notice itself and the default
provision in the lease.

There was no testimonial evidence

presented at trial on the issue and Judge Harding relied solely
on the documentary evidence in reaching his conclusion.

The

Memorandum Decision (attached as Addendum "An to Appellant's
Brief) states:

"After examination of the default provision in

the lease and the notice served on defendant, the Court finds
that plaintiff's intent in serving that notice was only an
attempt to seek the rent due at that time . . . ."

The trial

court's finding was, in fact, a legal conclusion based on its
interpretation of the Notice and the default provision on the
lease without resort to extrinsic evidence.

Accordingly, the

trial court's conclusion of law should be reviewed for
correctness.
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But even if this Court finds that a "clearly erroneous11
standard of review governs in this case, the trial court's
finding must be reversed.

This Court must look to the four

corners of the two controlling documents, the Notice to Pay Rent
or Quit and the default provision of the lease agreement, because
the record contains no other evidence, to determine whether the
Notice constituted an election of remedies. The documents speak
for themselves and Bireley is confident that in the alternative
this Court will conclude that the trial court's decision was
clearly erroneous.
POINT II
THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE UTAH AND
COLORADO UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTES ARE
MEANINGLESS IN THIS CONTEXT.
This Court should adopt the general rule of Colorado that a
"Notice to Pay or Quit" "constitutes an election by the landlord
to terminate the lease unless the Notice is rendered ineffective
by the tenant's payment of rent." Aiqner v. Cowell Sales Co.,
660 P.2d 907, 908 (Colo. 1983).

Century Park attempts to dis-

tinguish Aiqner on the basis that the Colorado unlawful detainer
statute differs from its Utah counterpart.
The distinctions between the unlawful detainer statutes of
Colorado and Utah are meaningless in this context.

First, there

is little basis for the proposition that, based solely on that
state's unlawful detainer statute, the Colorado Supreme Court
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came to the conclusion that a notice to pay or quit constitutes
an election of remedies and thereby terminates a lease. Furthermore, both the Colorado and Utah statutes regarding unlawful
detainer speak in terms of a "forfeiture."
The general rule recognized in Aigner was first laid out by
the Colorado Supreme Court in Barlow v. Hoffman, 103 Colo. 286,
86 P.2d 239 (1938).

The applicable lease provisions and demand

to pay or quit were substantially identical in Aigner and Barlow.
The Aigner court noted that in Barlow they held that "the
lessor's notice was 'analogous to a notice which one who is a
party to any terminable contract gives in order to rescind it at
law, as distinguished from equity.'"

Aigner, 660 P.2d at 909

(citing Barlow, 103 Colo, at 291, 86 P.2d at 241).

The Aigner

court relied on the rationale of Barlow, and in part, upon the
unlawful detainer statute, in formulating the general rule
Bireley asks this Court to adopt.

This Court should not be

dissuaded by the subtle differences between the Utah and Colorado
statutes because the Aigner court based its decision upon other
sound principles of law.
The Colorado unlawful detainer statute cited by the Aigner
court provides that:

"a failure to pay such rent, upon demand,

whenever made, works a forfeiture."
104(1)(d)(1973).

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-

The statute also provides for forfeiture of a

lease under certain conditions.
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Pursuant to Utah's unlawful detainer statute, a tenant of
real property is liable for unlawful detainer:
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or
by subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any
condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, other than those previously
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the
alternative the performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon him
and upon any'subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after
service. Within three days after the service of the
notice, the tenant, or any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, . • . may perform the condition
or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture
except that if the covenants and conditions of the
lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be
performed, then no notice need be given.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(1) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
According to the Utah statute, the only way to save a lease from
forfeiture under certain circumstances is to pay the requested
past-due rent.

If the tenant vacates pursuant to a notice to

perform or surrender the property, the lease agreement is
forfeited.
Since the Colorado case law relied on here is not based
exclusively on the statutory language of Colorado's unlawful
detainer statute and since Utah's statute also speaks in terms of
a "forfeiture," there is no reason why this Court should not
follow the sound reasoning of the Colorado court and hold that
the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit constituted an election by Century
Park terminating the lease; and that Bireley is only liable for
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rent through the date he quit the premises upon receipt of the
Notice from Century Park.
POINT III
SINCE CENTURY PARK FAILED TO GIVE BIRELEY ANY
INDICATION WHATEVER THAT IT INTENDED TO
CONTINUE TO HOLD HIM RESPONSIBLE FOR RENT
AFTER VACATION OF THE PREMISES, BIRELEY1S
POSSESSORY RIGHT WAS EXTINGUISHED AND THE
LEASE WAS TERMINATED.
Century Park gave Bireley no indication whatever that it
intended to continue to hold him responsible for rent after he
vacated the premises.

The record is bereft of any evidence which

would indicate Bireley had reason to know he was expected to
continue to pay rent after being given the alternative to pay or
quit the premises.

He opted to quit and heard nothing from

Century Park regarding the question of continuing rent until the
pretrial order was prepared in this case in January of 1990.

The

pretrial order raised the question for the first time.
If Century Park intended to hold Bireley liable for the full
term of the lease agreement, Bireley should have had a possessory
right tr the premises, subject only to Century Park's reasonable
mitigation efforts.

It would be patently unfair to hold that

Bireley "lost all rights, but retained all obligations of the
contract."

Executive House Bldg., Inc. v. Optimum Systems, Inc.,

311 So.2d 604, 607 (La. App. 1975).

Here, Century Park simply

took back the premises and relet them directly without regard to
any of Bireleyfs rights.
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Century Park had an affirmative responsibility to advise
Bireley, in clear language, that in serving the Notice to Pay
Rent or Quit it was only attempting to collect rent pursuant to
notice and that electing to relinquish possession of the property
did not terminate the lease.

Century Park failed to do so.

The evidence is clear that on or about November 6, 1987,
Century Park took possession of the leased premises and never
again offered or conveyed possession to Bireley.

Since Century

Park never gave consideration to Bireley in exchange for his
alleged obligation to pay rent for the duration of the lease
term, there is no basis to find the lease was enforceable beyond
the election to terminate in November, 1987.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision with respect to Century Park's
intent in serving the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, was a
conclusion of law to be reviewed for correctness.

Bireley

contends that the trial court was incorrect when it concluded
that the Notice was only an attempt to seek rent due and not an
election of remedies.

This Court should adopt the Colorado rule

of Aiqner, which Century Park has failed to meaningfully
distinguish, and hold as a matter of law that once Century Park
served Bireley with the Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, and once
Bireley opted to quit and delivered up possession, the lease was
terminated between the parties.
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DATED this

2.£^ day of January, 1991.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By QvWfofl tyhlU$t/\ )

George A. Hun£/
E l i z a b e t h King
Camille N. Johnson
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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